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Non–technical Summary
Based on a new and exceptionally rich administrative data set for Germany, we
evaluate the employment effects of four different further training programs in the
early 2000s. We consider dynamic aspects of selection into different programs as
well as effect heterogeneity with respect to different population subgroups. From an
economic policy point of view, we address the following two important questions: (1)
the question whether relatively short training measures can compete in effectiveness
with more involved medium- to longterm measures, and (2) the question whether
practically oriented training programs have advantages over theoretical classroom
training.
Our analysis distinguishes the following four types of training programs: short
term training, classroom further training, practical further training, and retraining.
Short-term training programs last on average several weeks and aim at providing
skills that facilitate job search. At the same time, these programs are used to assess
and to monitor the abilities and the willingness to work of the unemployed. Class-
room and practical further training programs last typically six to twelve months.
They provide specific professional skills, either at a theoretical or at a practical level.
In contrast to classroom further training, practical further training is usually con-
ducted in a training firm or in the context of an internship. Retraining is with an
average duration of two to three years the most comprehensive type of training. It
provides a new professional degree according to the German apprenticeship system.
In order to take account of the dynamic sorting process among the unemployed, the
treatment status is defined subject to the time window of elapsed unemployment
duration. The treatment parameter we estimate thus mirrors the decision problem
of the case worker and the unemployed who recurrently during the unemployment
spell decide whether to start any of the programs now or to postpone participation
to the future. We evaluate the employment effects of the four training programs
against each of the possible alternatives, i.e. waiting further in open unemployment
or participating in one of the other three programs.
For the comparison of participating against waiting, we find statistically significant
positive employment effects for male and female participants in short-term training
and classroom further training in West Germany who started their training not
too early during their unemployment spell. Moreover, West German women but not
West German men benefited from practical further training programs. A closer look
reveals that, within the time window permitted by our data set, employment effects
of short-term training are of a similar magnitude as those of traditional medium-
term programs. However, due to the shorter length, the positive effects of the
former materialize much earlier. Whereas for the medium-term programs the initial
lock-in period, characterized by strongly negative employment effects, lasts eight to
14 months, it takes only up to two months for short-term training. According to
our results, West German men taking part in short-term training or medium-term
training increase their medium-term employment rate by some 5 to 10 percentage
points. The effect for women is even larger, lying somewhat above 10 percentage
points.
The surprising effectiveness of short-term training when compared to the different
forms of medium-term training is also confirmed in the pairwise comparisons of the
training programs. In particular, this holds for the comparison of short-term training
against classroom further training. However, the results are less clear for the com-
parison with practically oriented further training, where it appears that participants
of practical further training courses would have reduced their employment chances
if they had taken part in short-term training instead. As to the comparison of class-
room and practical further training, our results suggest that practical training may
have advantages over pure classroom training. Furthermore, the effects of training
programs may be very different across different subgroups. Employment effects are
generally larger for individuals who start their program later in the unemployment
spell and for women than for men. In some cases older individuals and individuals
with low qualifications benefit less. Finally, in contrast to the somewhat positive
picture for West Germany, we find only little evidence for positive treatment effects
in East Germany.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an enormously increased interest in the evaluation of ac-
tive labor market policies, both in the US and Europe (for comprehensive overviews
see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), Martin (2000), Martin and Grubb (2001),
Kluve and Schmidt (2002) and Kluve (2006)). While, due to methodological and
data limitations, earlier studies typically focussed on the evaluation of a single pro-
gram, recent developments in evaluation methodology and data access have made it
possible to gain deeper insights into the possibly very heterogenous effects of differ-
ent types of programs and their comparative effectiveness. Prominent examples of
recent evaluations involving multiple comparisons of different programs are Lechner
(2002), Gerfin and Lechner (2002), Sianesi (2003), Hardoy (2005) and Dyke et al.
(2006). This progress has been made possible by both methodological developments,
in particular the extension of propensity score matching methods to the case of mul-
tiple treatments (Imbens (2000), Lechner (2001)), and the increasing availability of
large, administrative data sets that provide the necessary sample sizes and program
information to carry out in-depth evaluations of narrowly defined sub-programs.
Given these new data sources, it is possible not only to evaluate the differential
effects of the classical instruments of active labor market policy such as public em-
ployment services, job creation in the public sector, or public training programs. It
has also become possible to evaluate different sub-programs within these categories,
for example to study the comparative effectiveness of different forms of employment
subsidies or different forms of public training programs.
This paper contributes to the growing evidence on the comparative effects of public
sponsored training programs. We focus on the differential effects of public training
programs in Germany. The case of Germany provides ideal conditions to study dif-
ferential effects of public sponsored training for several reasons. First, the country
has a long tradition of extensive active labor market programs covering all kinds of
approaches.2 As to public training programs, the Federal Employment Office of Ger-
many has been offering a wide range of different programs ranging from very short
measures aimed at minor skill adjustments and job search assistance to medium- and
long-term programs with the explicit goal of increasing the human capital of the par-
ticipants. In fact, the range of programs offered is much wider than in most other
countries and the durations of typical programs vary between one or two weeks to
2The total expenditure on active labor market policies was over 20 billion in 2004 (see Bunde-
sagentur für Arbeit (2005a)). Programs include, among others, job search assistance, employment
subsidies, job creation in the public sector, youth measures, measures to promote self-employment,
and public training programs.
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several months or even several years. Another reason for using Germany is that the
country has recently developed a growing awareness for the need to evaluate active
labor market policies, which helped to open up existing administrative data bases
to rigorous scientific research.3 This has led to large, informative data sets merging
different administrative sources. These data sets not only contain precise informa-
tion on individual employment and transfer receipt histories but also comprehensive
and detailed information on participation in all public sponsored measures of active
labor market policy.4 Large sample sizes make it possible to address aspects that
have hitherto been difficult or impossible to address such as the heterogeneity of
programs, the heterogeneity of effects across different groups of participants and the
dynamic selection into different programs.
This paper provides a comprehensive and detailed econometric evaluation of pub-
lic training programs conducted in Germany during the period February 2000 to
January 2002. We distinguish different types of programs and consider effect het-
erogeneity with respect to population subgroups. Building on the work of Sianesi
(2003, 2004) on dynamic treatments and on the work of Lechner (2001) on pairwise
comparison of multiple treatments, we employ a stratified matching approach based
on the propensity score, the elapsed duration of unemployment, and the calendar
time. In order to take account of dynamic sorting processes, we stratify treatment
effects by elapsed duration of unemployment. Our results show that average effects
for too broad populations may hide statistically and economically significant treat-
ment effects for individual subgroups and therefore help to understand why previous
evaluation studies often yielded inconclusive results. While in many cases there is
no discernible effect heterogeneity between subgroups, there is some evidence that
the effects decline for older workers and for low–skilled workers. In these cases, the
differences in treatment effects are very pronounced.
From an economic policy point of view, we address two important questions that
have recently attracted considerable attention: the question whether relatively short
training measures can compete in effectiveness with more involved medium- to long-
term measures, and the question whether practically oriented training programs have
advantages over theoretically oriented class-room training. Our main motivation
3As a part of major labor market reforms, the so-called Hartz-Reforms, the need for rigorous
scientific evaluation of program effectiveness was explicitly encoded into the law, see e.g. Jacobi
and Kluve (2006).
4In fact, part of the project leading to this paper was the design and the validation of a merged
administrative data base in cooperation with the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung
of the Federal Employment Office. This data base has subsequently been used for most of the
policy evaluations in the context of the Hartz-Reforms.
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for the first question is that, traditionally, the focus of German public training
programs was on medium- to long-term measures lasting several months to several
years. Following criticism that such programs may not be effective as they ‘lock-in’
the participants for a long time, there has been a drastic shift towards short-term
programs recently.5 In terms of the number of participants, short-term training
measures are by now the largest program of German active labor market policy.
One of our aims is to evaluate whether or not this policy change can be justified
ex-post. The specific form of short-term measures in Germany is also interesting
from another point of view, as these measures often comprise elements of job search
assistance, profiling or monitoring of the unemployed, apart from the provision of
specific skills. By evaluating these kinds of programs we therefore also contribute to
the literature that has focused on these specific forms of active labor market policy
(see e.g. Martin (2000), Dolton and O’Neill (2002) and OECD (2005)).
The second question we address is also of considerable policy interest. It concerns
the contents of training programs and focuses on the aspect of whether practically
oriented training measures are better suited to provide unemployed workers with
the skills and qualifications needed to improve labor market chances. Our results
support hypotheses put forward in the literature (see e.g. Martin and Grubb (2001)
and OECD (2005)) that practically oriented training may have advantages over pure
classroom training. In this regard, our findings are in contrast to earlier findings for
Germany during the 1990’s, see Lechner et al. (2005a), Fitzenberger et al. (2006a),
and Fitzenberger and Völter (2007).
A key advantage of our methodology is that it allows us to directly compare training
programs, i.e. to ask the question of what would have happened if participants in
short-term programs had participated in longer-term programs, or if participants in
classroom training had taken part in more practically oriented training. This leads
to more informative results than if one compares the effectiveness of different types
of training when compared to not taking part in training at all. These results can
directly be used for policy purposes, as they provide information on which programs
are most advantageous for whom.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. In section 3 we describe the main institutional features of the German
system of public sponsored training. Section 4 presents details on the data used in
this study. In section 5, we describe our econometric evaluation strategy. Section 6
discusses our empirical results, and section 7 concludes.
5See e.g. Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2005b), and figure 1 below.
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2 Literature Review
Although there exists a vast literature evaluating different aspects of active labor
market policies in different countries (see the overview studies by Heckman, LaLonde
and Smith (1999), Martin (2000), Martin and Grubb (2001), Kluve and Schmidt
(2002) and Kluve (2006)) there are relatively few studies that focus on the compar-
ative effects of different forms of training programs.
One of the first studies to consider differences in the outcomes of training programs
was Gerfin and Lechner (2002). Using data for Switzerland, Gerfin and Lechner dis-
tinguished between five forms of public sponsored training programs with durations
ranging between 5 and 13 weeks. Their results were negative in the sense that, one
year after program start, the employment rate of participants was lower than that
of comparable non-participants. However, longer, more involved training courses
seemed to produce less negative results than shorter ones.
Most recent studies that focus on the differential effects of training programs use
data for Germany. For example, Lechner et al. (2005a,b) evaluate the effects of
a variety of training programs employed in East and West Germany in the 1990s.
They distinguish between medium-term programs (mean duration 4 months), longer
programs (mean duration 9 to 12 months) and long programs with specific contents
such as retraining or training in a practice firm. Lechner et al. conclude that most
of the programs had positive effects in the long run, even in East Germany. An im-
portant finding is that medium-term programs seem to outperform longer programs
as they exhibit a much shorter lock-in period with otherwise similar employment
effects after the end of the program. These findings are shared by Fitzenberger
and Speckesser (2007), Fitzenberger et al. (2006a), and Fitzenberger and Völter
(2007) who use the same data source but different econometric methods. Contrary
to common hypotheses about the effectiveness of more practically oriented train-
ing programs (see e.g. Martin and Grubb (2001) or OECD (2005)), Lechner et al.
(2005a), Fitzenberger et al. (2006a), and Fitzenberger and Völter (2007) do not
find that practical training as implemented in the 1990s dominates other kinds of
training.
Using more recent and more informative data, Hujer et al. (2004) study the effec-
tiveness of training programs in the early 2000s depending upon the duration of the
programs. The study distinguishes programs of short (1-3 months), medium (6-12
months), and long (over 12 months) duration and estimates a multivariate mixed
proportional hazard model. The results imply strong lock-in effects for the time the
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programs are attended but no significant effects on the exit rate from unemployment
after completion of the program. Schneider et al. (2006) present policy evaluation
results commissioned by the federal government in the context of the Hartz-Reforms.
Although their focus is on the changes caused by these reforms, they also provide
some results on the comparative effectiveness of a number of medium-term and long-
term training programs. Their results also confirm the finding that shorter programs
may be more effective than longer ones.
A drawback of all of these studies is that they omit the by now most important
type of public sponsored training in Germany, so-called short-term training (‘Train-
ingsmaßnahmen’) – this program is not to be confused with short further training
programs as analyzed by Hujer et al. (2004) or Lechner et al. (2005a,b). Short-term
training courses typically last only 2 to 12 weeks and often combine elements of job
search assistance with the provision of specific skills (see more detailed description
below). In light of the policy debate (Martin and Grubb (2001) or OECD (2005)),
short-term training seems attractive since it may serve the purpose of activating
the unemployed without locking them in lengthy training programs. Furthermore, a
number of recent contributions from the evaluation literature suggest that increased
job search assistance may be an inexpensive way to help unemployed individuals
back into employment (see e.g. Blundell et al. (2004), Weber and Hofer (2004),
Fougère et al. (2005), Hujer et al. (2005), Crépon et al. (2005), and Van den Berg
and Van der Klaauw (2006)).
The only other two studies we are aware of that consider short-term training in
Germany are Hujer et al. (2006), and Lechner and Wunsch (2006). Hujer et al.
examine whether participation in short-term training measures reduces the unem-
ployment duration of West German job-seekers. They do not compare short-term
training to other measures of active labor market policy. Lechner and Wunsch (2006)
evaluate a large number of different training and non-training measures in East Ger-
many, among them short-term training. Their results suggest no or even negative
effects for all programs considered. Lechner and Wunsch explain their finding by
the difficult situation in the East German labor market.
3 Training as Part of Active Labor Market Policy
The main goal of German active labor market policy is to permanently reintegrate
unemployed individuals (and individuals who are at risk of becoming unemployed)
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back into employment. The policy instruments cover a wide range of different mea-
sures such as employment subsidies, job creation in the public sector, measures
directed at youth unemployment, measures to promote self-employment, and public
training programs. For an overview over the different kinds of policies and their
quantitative importance, see figure 1 and table 3 in the appendix.6
— Figure 1 about here —
As shown in figure 1, public training programs have traditionally been the most
important part of German active labor market policy. There are three main cat-
egories of training programs: short-term training (‘Trainingsmaßnahmen’), further
training (‘Berufliche Weiterbildung’), and retraining (‘Umschulung’).7 Apart from
the fact that all three types of training require full-time participation, they differ
considerably in length and contents. Recently, short-term training has become the
largest training program regarding the number of participants – for the following,
see Kurtz (2003). Short-term training measures last only two to twelve weeks (the
mean duration is slightly over four weeks, see table 1) and typically pursue one or
several of the following three aims. A first potential aim is aptitude and qualification
testing, i.e. the program is used to assess job seekers’ labor market opportunities
and their suitability for different jobs. This may also entail profiling activities on the
side of the Federal Employment Office and preparation of more detailed work plans
to reintegrate the job seeker into the labor market. A second aim is to test the job
seeker’s willingness to work and to improve job search skills. This may be achieved
through activities such as job-application training, simulation of job interviews or
general counseling on job search methods. The third and final aim of short-term
training measures is the provision of specific skills that are necessary to improve the
job seeker’s labor market prospects. Typical examples for this type of measures are
computer courses or courses providing commercial training. In 2001, 22 percent of
short-term training measures belonged to the first type, 19 percent to the second
type, and some 28 percent to the third type. About 31 percent were combinations of
the different types. In most cases, these were combinations of job search assistance
6This paper focuses on public training programs attended in the period 2000 to 2002. The
following paragraphs describe the relevant institutional settings up to the end of 2002, before
the Hartz-Reforms were enacted. The reforms also changed some of the rules on public training
programs. These changes are not relevant to our study but they will be important for future
evaluations (see e.g. Biewen and Fitzenberger (2004) or Schneider et al. (2006)).
7In addition, there are specific training schemes for youth unemployed and disabled persons, as
well as German language courses for asylum seekers and ethnic Germans returning from former
German settlements in Eastern Europe. These training measures are not considered here.
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and the provision of specific skills, or aptitude testing and the provision of specific
skills (Kurtz, 2003, tables A3 and A6).
In comparison to short-term training, the more substantial further training pro-
grams typically take much longer and are more involved. With durations ranging
between several months and one year, further training measures can be classified
as medium-term programs. Their aim is to maintain, update, adjust, and extend
professional skills and qualifications. Further training programs cover a wide range
of courses in a variety of fields and may also comprise practical elements such as
on-the-job training, internships or working in practice firms. In our evaluation we
will distinguish between practically-oriented further training programs (which are
typically of shorter duration) and pure class-room training. Apart from short-term
and further training, employment offices also offer retraining. Retraining programs
last two to three years and typically lead to a new vocational education degree within
the German apprenticeship system. Retraining may involve vocational training in a
profession that was not the original profession of the job seeker. In addition, retrain-
ing may be granted to job seekers who face difficult labor market prospects because
they lack a vocational degree in the first place. In general, retraining programs are
similar to regular apprenticeships and typically combine class-room training with
on-the-job training.
To become eligible for participation in one of the training programs, job seekers have
to register personally at the local labor office. This involves a counseling interview
with the caseworker. Besides being registered as unemployed or as a job seeker at
risk of becoming unemployed, candidates for short-term training do not have to fulfil
any additional eligibility criteria. In the case of medium- and long-term training,
individuals are typically eligible only if they also fulfil a minimum work requirement
of one year and if they are entitled to unemployment compensation. However, there
are several exceptions to these requirements. The really binding criterium is that
the training scheme has to be considered necessary in order for the job seeker to
find a new job. This is, for example, the case if the employment chances in the
target occupation of a job seeker are good but require an additional adjustment of
skills. Training measures are usually assigned by the caseworker. Depending on
regional and local circumstances, caseworkers may exercise a great deal of discretion
when allocating the different programs. Suitable programs are chosen from a pool
of certified public or private institutions or firms.
If a person is admitted to one of the training measures, the employment office pays
all direct training costs. In addition, the participants of short-term training may con-
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tinue to receive unemployment benefits or means-tested unemployment assistance,
if they are eligible for such transfer payments. Participants of short-term training
are still registered unemployed during the program. In contrast, participants of fur-
ther training or retraining do not remain registered unemployed during the program.
Participants of further training and retraining usually also receive a subsistence al-
lowance provided they fulfill a minimum work requirement of twelve months within
the last three years. This subsistence allowance is usually of the same amount as un-
employment benefits or unemployment assistance. Overall, there are no significant
financial incentives for unemployed individuals to participate in a training program,
in contrast to the situation in Germany before 1998, see Fitzenberger et al. (2006a).
— Table 1 about here —
Table 1 shows that the average monthly training costs per participant are lower
for short-term training courses (about 570 Euros in 2001) than for the longer-term
measures (664 Euros). Given the that average length of short-term measures is only
1.1 months while that of longer-term measures is some 9.3 months, this results in
training costs for short-term measures (627 Euros) that amount to only about one
tenth of those for medium- and long-term measures (6175 Euros).8 Since 2002, in
light of huge differences in costs, the Federal Employment Office has been drastically
increasing the share of short-term training measures at the expense of longer-term
measures (see figure 1). Of course, the higher training costs may be justified if the
medium- to long-term measures lead to correspondingly higher gains in employment
probabilities. This one of the main questions motivating our evaluation.
4 Data
4.1 Integrated Biographies Sample
Our study uses a new and exceptionally rich administrative data base, the so-called
Integrated Biographies Sample (IEBS). This data base has only recently been made
available by the Federal Employment Office of Germany.9 The IEBS is a merged
8In addition to the direct costs, participants in longer-term training schemes usually receive the
subsistence allowance. However, the subsistence payments simply replace the ordinary unemploy-
ment compensation the participants would have otherwise received.
9For more information on the IEBS, see Osikominu (2005, section 3) and Hummel et al. (2005).
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2.2% random sample of individual data drawn from the universe of data records
collected through four different administrative processes. Our version of the IEBS
has been supplemented with additional information which is not publicly available
(especially information on health). The IEBS contains detailed daily information
on employment subject to social security contributions, receipt of transfer payments
during unemployment, job search, and participation in different programs of active
labor market policy. In addition, the IEBS comprises a large variety of covariates
including socio-economic characteristics (information on family, health and educa-
tional qualifications), occupational and job characteristics, extensive firm and sec-
toral information, as well as details on individual job search histories and assessments
of case workers. For evaluation purposes, a rich set of covariates is essential as it
can be used to reconstruct the circumstances that did or did not lead to the partic-
ipation in a particular program thus making it possible to control for the selection
of individuals into programs.
We give a brief description of the IEBS in order to underscore its value for eval-
uation purposes. The IEBS is based on four different administrative sources
the so-called Employment History (‘Beschäftigten-Historik’), the Benefit Recip-
ient History (‘Leistungsempfänger-Historik’), the Supply of Applicants (‘Bewer-
berangebot’), and the Data Base of Program Participants (‘Massnahme-Teilnehmer-
Gesamtdatenbank’).
The Employment History involves register data comprising employment information
for all employees subject to contributions to the public social security system. It
covers the time period 1990 to 2004. The main feature of this data is detailed
daily information on the employment status of each recorded individual. We use
this information to account for the labor market history of individuals as well as to
measure employment outcomes. For each employment spell, in addition to start and
end dates, data from the Employment History contains information on personal as
well as job and firm characteristics such as wage, industry, or occupation.
The second data source, the Benefit Recipient History, includes daily spells of all un-
employment benefit, unemployment assistance and subsistence allowance payments
between January 1990 and June 2005. It also contains information on personal char-
acteristics. The Benefit Recipient History is important as it provides information on
the periods in which individuals were out of employment and therefore not covered
by the Employment History. In particular, the Benefit Recipient History includes
information about the exact start and end dates of periods of transfer receipt. We
expect this information to be very reliable since it is, at the administrative level,
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directly linked to flows of benefit payments. The Information on benefit payments al-
low us to construct individual benefit histories dating back several years. Moreover,
we use additional information contained in the Benefit Recipients History involv-
ing sanctions and periods of disqualification from benefit receipt that may serve as
indicators for a lack of motivation.
The third administrative data source of the IEBS is the so-called Supply of Ap-
plicants, which contains data on individuals searching for jobs. The Supply of
Applicants data cover the period January 1997 to June 2005. In our study they
are used in two ways. First, they provide additional information about the labor
market status of a person, in particular whether the person in question searches for
a job but is not (yet) registered as unemployed or whether he or she is sick while
registered unemployed. Second, the job search episodes include additional informa-
tion about personal characteristics, in particular about educational qualifications,
nationality, and marital status. They also provide information about whether the
applicant wishes to change occupations, about health problems that might influence
employment chances, and about the labor market prospects of the applicants as
assessed by the case worker. Finally, the data on applicants include regional and
local identifiers, which we use to link regional and local information, for example
unemployment rates at the district level.
The fourth data source in the IEBS is the Data Base of Program Participants, which
is particularly important for evaluation purposes. This data base contains detailed
information on participation in public sector sponsored labor market programs cov-
ering the period January 2000 to July 2005. Similar to the other sources, information
comes in the form of spells indicating the start and end dates at the daily level, the
type of the program as well as additional information on the program such as the
planned end date, whether the participant entered the program with a delay, and
whether the program was successfully completed. The Data Base of Program Par-
ticipants not only contains information on the set of training measures evaluated in
this paper, but also on other programs such as employment subsidies. This is im-
portant, as it enables us to distinguish between regular and subsidized employment
when evaluating employment outcomes.10
10A disadvantage of the data covering labor market training in German in the 1990s used in
studies such as Fitzenberger et al. (2006a), Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007), Fitzenberger and
Völter (2007), and Lechner et al. (2005a,b) is that it is not possible to distinguish whether
participants found employment in the regular labor market or whether they took part in job
creation measures. Note that for the time period from the year 2000 onwards, Lechner et al.
(2005a,b) use the information based on the IEBS whether an individual is employed in a subsidized
job.
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Being among the first to use the IEBS, we were involved in comprehensive data
checks.11 We ran extensive consistency checks of the records coming from the dif-
ferent sources, making use of additional information on the data generating process
provided to us by the Institute for Employment Research.12 Our conclusion is that
on the one hand the employment and benefit data are highly reliable concerning
employment status, wage and transfer payments, and the start and end dates of
spells. The likely reason for this is that contribution rates and benefit entitlements
are directly based on this information. On the other hand, information not needed
for these administrative purposes can be less reliable. For example, in the employ-
ment data base the educational variable appears to be affected by non-negligible
measurement error as it is not directly relevant for social security entitlements (see
Fitzenberger et al. (2006b) for imputation methods to correct the education vari-
able). Personal characteristics exhibit a higher degree of reliability in the program
participation and job seeker data, because they are relevant for the purpose of as-
signing job offers or programs to the unemployed. In our evaluation, we exploited
the available information as efficiently as possible by choosing the data source that
is most reliable for a given purpose.
Although the data in the IEBS generally seem very reliable, there is some need for
data corrections. In particular, we corrected in some cases the end dates of program
spells if there was evidence that the end dates recorded in the data base of program
participation was wrong. For details on measurement error in program end dates in
the IEBS and correction procedures, see Waller (2007).
4.2 Evaluation Sample and Training Programs
We follow an evaluation strategy (see below) that is based on comparisons with
(multiple) control groups. A common feature of control group approaches is that
they partition the group of potential participants into a group of participants and
a group of non-participants. As a consequence, the first question that has to be
answered when selecting the evaluation sample is that of who is a potential program
participant.
For several reasons, we decide to focus on individuals who become unemployed after
having been continuously employed for at least three months, instead of individuals
11Given the non-trivial task of merging four large scale administrative data sources of very
different designs such checks were indispensable.
12This work is documented in Bender et al. (2004, 2005).
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who are observed unemployed at a given point of time. This is to avoid the case
of individuals registering as unemployed from being out of labor force because they
want to participate in a training program. In interviews, case workers told us that
especially women returning from maternity leave, divorcees, or university graduates
who have difficulty finding a job may contact the local employment office inquiring
about the possibility of participating in public training programs. However, these
individuals often only register as unemployed if the chances of actual participation
are high enough. An evaluation sample based on observed unemployment status
(instead of an inflow sample into unemployment) would therefore suffer from the
problem of an incompletely observed control group, because it would be difficult
to find comparable non-participants for those individuals who endogenously regis-
ter as unemployed (due to their non-registering as unemployed, non-participating
counterparts would not appear in the sample). Analyzing an inflow sample into
unemployment, we focus on individuals who have been attached to the labor mar-
ket, which helps to construct the control group based on the labor market relevant
information in the data. Furthermore, the beginning of unemployment defines a
natural time scale to align treated and nontreated individuals.
In the following, we focus on an inflow sample into unemployment consisting of
individuals who became unemployed between the beginning of February 2000 and
the end of January 2002, after having been continuously employed for at least three
months. Entering unemployment is defined as quitting regular (not marginal), non-
subsidized employment and subsequently being in contact with the employment
office (not necessarily immediately), either through benefit receipt, program partic-
ipation or a job search spell.13 In order to exclude individuals eligible for specific
labor market programs for the youth and individuals eligible for early retirement
schemes, we only consider persons aged between 25 and 53 years at the beginning
of their unemployment spell. Our evaluation focusses on the first training program
that is attended in the course of an unemployment spell.
Based on the description of program types in section 3, we analyze four different
types of training, which closely follows the legal grouping of program types:
• short-term training (STT),
• classroom further training (CFT),
13Note that this implies that the same individual may appear more than once in our evaluation
sample. About ten percent of the individuals in our sample are represented by more than one
unemployment spell according to the above definition. We take account of multiple inclusion of
the same individual in the sample when calculating standard errors, see section 5.
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• practical further training (PFT), and
• retraining (RT).
In some cases, we grouped programs whose planned duration and contents did not
really fit into the category defined by the law into the category that was most
appropriate from an economic point of view. According to the same criteria, we
also grouped measures of ‘discretionary support’ (Freie Förderung) and measures
financed through the European Social Fund (Europäischer Sozialfond, ESF) into
one of the four program categories. We carry out our evaluations for men and
women, for East and West Germany, and (for reasons explained in the next section)
for different durations of elapsed unemployment separately. This results in a total
number of twelve evaluation samples, the sample sizes of which are shown in table
4 in the appendix. Table 7 and figure 16 provide descriptive information on the
duration of different program types. STT is the shortest program and RT the
longest program. Durations for CFT are fairly uniformly distributed between 1 and
12 months with a strong spike at 12 months. PFT is shorter than CFT and shows
a strong spike at 7 months.
5 Econometric Implementation
Our goal is to analyze the effect of the K = 4 different training programs (STT,
CFT, PFT, RT) on monthly employment at the individual level. In a situation where
individuals have multiple treatment options, we estimate the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT) of one training program against nonparticipation in any
of the three programs and of pairwise comparisons of two programs. Extending the
static multiple treatment approach to a dynamic setting, we follow Sianesi (2003,
2004) and apply the standard static treatment approach recursively depending on the
elapsed unemployment duration. The implementation builds upon the approach for
binary treatment in Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007) and for multiple treatments
in Fitzenberger et al. (2006a). In contrast to these earlier papers, we also analyze
the heterogeneity of the estimated ATT by various socio-economic characteristics of
the treated individuals.
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5.1 Multiple Treatments in a Dynamic Context
Our empirical analysis is based upon the potential-outcome-approach to causality,
see Roy (1951), Rubin (1974), and the survey of Heckman et al. (1999). Lechner
(2001) and Imbens (2000) extend this framework to allow for multiple, exclusive
treatments. Let the potential outcome Y k, k = 1, ..., 4, represent the outcome asso-
ciated with training program k and Y 0 is the outcome when participating in none of
the 4 training programs. For each individual, only one of the K + 1 potential out-
comes is observed and the remaining K outcomes are counterfactual. We estimate
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of participating in treatment
k = 1, 2, 3, 4 against nonparticipation k = 0 (treatment versus waiting) and the
differential effects of the programs (program k versus program l where k, l 6= 0), see
Lechner (2001).
Fredriksson and Johansson (2003, 2004) argue that a static evaluation analysis,
which assigns unemployed individuals to a treatment group and a nontreatment
group based on the treatment information observed in the data, yields biased treat-
ment effects. This is because the definition of the control group conditions on future
outcomes or future treatment. For Sweden, Sianesi (2004) argues that all unem-
ployed individuals are potential future participants in active labor market programs,
a view which is particularly plausible for countries with comprehensive systems of
active labor market policies (like Germany). This discussion implies that a purely
static evaluation of the different training programs is not warranted. Following
Sianesi (2003, 2004), we analyze the effects of the first participation in a training
program during the unemployment spell considered conditional on the starting date
of the treatment. We distinguish between treatment starting during months 0 to 3
of the unemployment spell (stratum 1), treatment starting during months 4 to 6
(stratum 2), and treatment starting during months 7 to 12 (stratum 3).
We analyze treatment conditional upon the unemployment spell lasting at least until
the start of the treatment k and this being the first treatment during the unemploy-
ment spell considered. Therefore, the ATT parameter (comparing treatments k and
l) of interest is
θ(k, l; u, τ) = E(Y k(u, τ)|Tu = k, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0)(1)
−E(Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Tu = k, u ≤ u˜ ≤ u¯, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0) ,
where Tu is the treatment variable for treatment starting in month u of unemploy-
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ment. Y k(u, τ), Y l(u, τ) are the potential treatment outcomes for treatments k and
l, respectively, in periods u+τ , where treatment starts in period u and τ = 0, 1, 2, ...,
counts the months since the beginning of treatment. When l = 0, we compare treat-
ment k versus waiting (nonparticipation in the stratum) and when l ≥ 1, we do a
pairwise comparison between treatment k and l. U is the duration of unemployment,
u˜ is the random month when alternative treatment l starts, and u¯ = 2, 4, 8 is the
last month in the stratum of elapsed unemployment considered. Then, τ − (u˜− u)
counts the months since start of treatment l yielding alignment of unemployment
experience, because u+ τ = u˜+(τ − (u˜−u)), and Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜−u)) is the outcome
of individuals who receive treatment l between period u and u¯. For starts of l later
than u, we have u˜ − u > 0 and therefore, before l starts, τ − (u˜ − u) < 0. Then,
these individuals are still unemployed, i.e. Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜ − u)) = 0 when the second
argument of Y l(., .) is negative. This way, we account for the fact that alternative
treatments, for which the individual receiving treatment k in period u is eligible,
might not start in the same month u. The treatment parameter we actually estimate
is the average within a stratum
θ(k, l; τ) =
∑
u
guθ(k, l;u, τ) ,
with respect to the distribution gu of starting dates u within the stratum.
Our estimated treatment parameter (1) mirrors the decision problem of the case
worker and the unemployed who recurrently during the unemployment spell decide
whether to start any of the programs now or to postpone participation to the future.
We evaluate the differential effects of multiple treatments assuming the following
dynamic version of the conditional mean independence assumption (DCIA)
E(Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Tu = k, u ≤ u˜ ≤ u¯, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0, X)(2)
= E(Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Tu˜ = l, u ≤ u˜ ≤ u¯, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0, X) ,
where X are time-varying as well as time-invariant (during the unemployment spell)
characteristics, Tu˜ = l indicates treatment l between u and u¯ (u¯ is the end of the
stratum of elapsed unemployment considered), and τ ≥ 0, see equation (1) above
and the analogous discussion in Sianesi (2004, p. 137). We effectively assume that
conditional on X, conditional on being unemployed at least until period u−1, and
conditional on not receiving any treatment before u (both referring to treatment
in period u) individuals are comparable in their outcome for treatment l occurring
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between u and u¯.
Building on Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) result on the balancing property of the
propensity score in the case of a binary treatment, Lechner (2001) shows that the
conditional probability of treatment k, given that the individual receives treatment
k or treatment l, P k|kl(X), exhibits an analogous balancing property for the pairwise
estimation of the ATT’s of program k versus l. This allows to apply standard binary
propensity score matching based on the sample of individuals participating in either
program k or in program l. For this subsample, we simply estimate the probability
of treatment k and then apply a bivariate extension of standard propensity matching
techniques. Implicitly, we assume that the actual beginning of treatment within a
stratum is random conditional on X.
To account for the dynamic treatment assignment, we estimate the probability of
treatment k given that unemployment lasts long enough to make an individual ‘eli-
gible’. For treatment during months 0 to 3, we take the total sample of unemployed,
who participate in k or l during months 0 to 3 (stratum 1), and estimate a Probit
model for participation in k. For l = 0, the group of nonparticipants in k includes
those unemployed who either never participate in any program or who start some
treatment after month 4. For treatment during strata 2 and 3, the basic sample
consists of those unemployed who are still unemployed in the first month of the
stratum.
We implement a stratified local linear matching approach by imposing that the
matching partners for an individual receiving treatment k are still unemployed in
the month before treatment k starts, i.e. we exactly align treated and nontreated
individuals by elapsed unemployment duration in months. For the comparison of
training against waiting, we align treated and controls in addition by the elapsed
duration of unemployment benefit receipt in months. The expected counterfactual
employment outcome for nonparticipation is obtained by means of a bivariate local
linear regression on the propensity score and the starting month of the unemploy-
ment spell. We use a product kernel in the estimated propensity score and the
calendar month of entry into unemployment
KK(p, c) = K
(
p− pj
hp
)
· h|c−cj |c ,(3)
where K(z) is the Gaussian kernel function, p and c are the propensity score and
the calendar month of entry into unemployment of a particular treated individual,
pj and cj are the estimated propensity score and the calendar month of entry into
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unemployment of an individual j belonging to the comparison group of individuals
treated with l. hp and hc are the bandwidths. Taken together, we impose three
matching requirements: i) similarity of the pairwise propensity score, ii) exact match
of the elapsed unemployment (and benefit receipt) duration, and iii) similarity of
beginning of unemployment.
We use a bivariate crossvalidation procedure to obtain the bandwidths hp and hc
by minimizing the squared prediction error for the average of the l-outcome for the
nearest neighbors of the participants in program k.14 An estimate for the variance
of the estimated treatment effects is obtained through bootstrapping based on 250
resamples. This way, we take account of the sampling variability in the estimated
propensity score.
As a balancing test, we use the regression test suggested in Smith and Todd (2005) to
investigate whether the covariates are balanced sufficiently by matching on the esti-
mated propensity score using a flexible polynomial approximation. Furthermore, we
investigate whether treated and matched nontreated individuals differ significantly in
their outcomes before the beginning of unemployment, in addition to those variables
already used as arguments of the propensity score. We estimate these differences
in the same way as the treatment effects after the beginning of the program. By
construction, treated individuals and their matched counterparts exhibit the same
unemployment duration until the beginning of treatment.
5.2 Specification of the Propensity Scores
First, we need to discuss the plausibility of the DCIA (2) for our application. For
propensity score matching to be a valid procedure one needs to control for the vari-
ables that jointly influence participation and outcomes such that, when conditioning
on these variables, potential outcomes are mean independent of treatment status.
It is therefore essential to base the estimation of the propensity scores on all rele-
vant information. Given our data base, we are in the lucky position to construct a
large set of time-constant as well as time-varying (within the unemployment spell)
variables to model the selection into the different training programs.
As Sianesi (2004), we argue that the participation probability depends upon the
variables determining re-employment prospects once unemployment began. Conse-
14This method is also used in Fitzenberger et al. (2006a) and it is an extension of the crossvali-
dation procedure suggested in Bergemann et al. (2004).
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quently, all individuals are considered who have left employment in the same two
years (matching controls for beginning of unemployment) and who have experienced
the same unemployment duration before program participation. Furthermore, ob-
servable individual characteristics and information from the previous employment
and benefit history have been included in the propensity score estimation. E.g., we
consider skill information, regional information, occupational status, and industry
which should be crucial for re-employment chances. In addition, we use subjec-
tive assessments of the unemployed by case workers, which should proxy for further
relevant unobserved characteristics. In addition to matching on the begínning of
unemployment and the elapsed duration of unemployment, we argue that the vari-
ables used in the estimation of the propensity score are rich enough to control for
the selection into treatment. This is particularly plausible because participation
occurred at a fairly large scale, assignment was not very targeted and driven by
the supply of programs, and case workers had little guidance on ‘what works for
whom’. Supporting our point of view, Schneider et al. (2006) argue that until 2002
assignment to training was strongly driven by the supply of available courses.
Concretely, we use the following variables and their interactions for the specification
of the propensity score.15
Personal characteristics
As personal characteristics, we consider age, disability status, schooling and pro-
fessional qualification, family status, whether there are children, whether there are
children under 10 years, nationality other than German, and whether the person in
question is an ethnic German who has migrated back into Germany (usually from
Eastern European countries).
Labor market and benefit histories
We use information on occupation and industry of the last job before unemployment,
whether this last job was less than full-time, whether it was a white-collar or blue-
collar position, the reason why this last job was ended, the quarter of the beginning
of the unemployment period, whether there were any periods of incapacity in the
last three years, the total length of employment (all durations are measured in
days) during the last three years, the duration of transfer payments during the
last three years (i.e. unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance, subsistence
15See the appendix for summary statistics and a more detailed description of the variables used.
Time-varying covariates are updated at the beginning of each stratum. For time-varying variables,
information from spells starting more than a few days later than the beginning of the respective
time window is not used in order to avoid endogeneity problems.
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allowance), times without any information in the data set, times of contact with the
employment office during the last three years before unemployment, whether the
person was employed 6, 12, 24 months before the beginning of the unemployment
period, log daily wage in the last job before unemployment, an indicator whether
this wage was censored, the log average wage in the year before unemployment and
censoring dummies related to this variable.
Case worker reported assessments
As to the assessment of the case workers with regards to the motivation, plans
and labor market prospects of the unemployed, we consider current health status,
past health problems, information on whether a program was canceled within the
last three years, penalties and disqualification from benefits within the last three
years, participation in a program with a social work component, indication of lack
of motivation within the last three years, the number of job proposals made the
unemployed received from the employment office, and information on the desired
job.
Regional information
We use different unemployment rates in the home district of an individual, the
districts which share the labor market classification of the region, the federal state,
and all of Germany.
Using these variables as possible regressors, we fit the propensity scores separately
for each of the twelve evaluation samples (men/women, East/West, stratum 1/2/3),
and each treatment comparison pair. In each case, we run an extensive specification
search. The final specification is chosen based on economic considerations, statistical
significance of the variables included, and the balancing tests described above.16 The
final specification typically includes 20 to 35 covariates.
5.3 Estimating Effect Heterogeneity
The estimation of the ATT provides a semiparametric, aggregate impact measure
for a possibly heterogeneous treatment group. However, it is conceivable that a
zero average hides positive and negative treatment effects for different subgroups of
16Estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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the treated. Although, one could estimate the ATT for each subgroup of interest17
using the dynamic matching estimator as described in section 5.1, such a strategy
is limited by the curse–of–dimensionality. The sample sizes of the subgroups need
to be sufficiently large to do so with reasonable precision.
As a simple alternative, we propose to run linear regressions of the estimated indi-
vidual cumulated treatment effects in the matched samples on a covariates which
could cause effect heterogeneity. Such regressions after matching are used in the
literature to adjust for possible remaining mismatch between treated individuals
and matched controls (see e.g. Lechner (1999)). However, we are not aware of any
recent study in the evaluation of active labor market policy that uses regressions
after matching to study effect heterogeneity. We focus on the cumulated treatment
effect after the end of the lock–in period.
To be specific, we run the following regressions in the matched sample for the cu-
mulated treatment effect over the months τ = T1, ..., T2
T2∑
τ=T1
(Y ki (τ)− Yˆ li (τ)) = α + xiβ + (xi − xˆi)γ + ui ,(4)
where individual i with covariates xi receives treatment k with observed outcome Y ki ,
Yˆ li and xˆi are the predicted, counterfactual l-outcome and the predicted covariates
based on the local linear regression in the matching procedure, and xi−xˆi represents
the mismatch between the average covariates of the matched comparison individuals
and the covariates of indvidual i. We estimate the cumulated effect over the time
interval [T1, T2] after the beginning of treatment. T1 and T2 are chosen specifically
for the program and the stratum under consideration. T1 is a proxy for the end of the
lock–in period and T2 is the last post treatment month observed. As a benchmark,
if β = γ = 0, then the estimated α corresponds to the estimated ATT for the entire
treatment sample and there is no systematic effect heterogeneity by the level of
covariates.
We test systematically for significant effect heterogeneity by covariates. The stan-
dard errors of the estimated regression coefficients are obtained through the boot-
strap procedure for the matching estimator by rerunning the regression (4) for all
resamples. In some cases, the regression (4) in the matched sample suffers from
multicollinearity problems due to the mismatch terms being highly correlated with
the covariates. In cases of strong multicollinearity, we exclude the mismatch from
17E.g. Lechner et al. (2005a) do so for a small number of subsets of the treatment sample to
investigate effect heterogeneity.
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the regression. As final results we only report those specification of the effect het-
erogeneity regressions with significant covariates.
6 Empirical Results
6.1 Training vs. ‘Waiting’
The evaluation results for training vs. not participating in any measure of active
labor market policy (‘waiting’) are shown in figures 2 to 6. Each graph displays
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), i.e. the difference between the
actual and the counterfactual employment outcome averaged over those individuals
who participate in the program under consideration. More precisely, we compare
the actual employment outcome of the treated to the employment outcome these
individuals would have had, had they not taken part in any other program in the
respective time window of their unemployment spell. As already mentioned, we
distinguish between programs starting in three different time windows (strata) of
elapsed unemployment: 0 to 3 months (stratum 1), 4 to 6 months (stratum 2), and
7 to 12 months (stratum 3). Due to the smaller number of treated individuals,
we only consider one time window ranging from month 0 to 12 for participants in
practical further training (PFT) and one ranging from month 0 to 3 for participants
in retraining (RT).
We evaluate treatment effects at different points in time. On the time axis in
our graphs, positive values denote months since the program start, while negative
values represent pre-unemployment months. We omit the period between the start of
unemployment and the start of the program where both control and treatment group
are unemployed. The dashed lines around the estimated ATT are bootstrapped 95
percent confidence bands. Treatment effects for a particular month are statistically
significant if zero is not contained in the confidence band.
— Figure 2 about here —
Figure 2 shows estimated treatment effects for short-term training programs (STT)
in West Germany. The results for men are given in the left column, while those
for women are shown in the right column. The figures suggest short and not very
pronounced lock-in effects of short-term training programs of minus five percentage
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points (i.e. during the program, participants had a five percentage points lower
monthly employment probability than they would have had if they had not partic-
ipated in the program). These lock-in effects do not last more than two or three
months, which is not surprising given the average length of such programs. After the
short lock-in period, the difference between actual and counterfactual employment
outcomes of participants turn positive. However, results seem to depend strongly on
elapsed unemployment duration. While there is no evidence for statistically signifi-
cant treatment effects for individuals participating in the first three months of their
unemployment spell (stratum 1), treatment effects for men starting a short-term
training program in months 7 to 12 (stratum 3) of their unemployment spell, and
women starting one in month 4 or later are positive and statistically significant (ex-
cept for men in stratum 2). According to these estimates, the monthly employment
probability of West German men participating in short-term training is increased
by about 5 percentage points. At some 10 percentage points, this effect is larger for
women.
— Figure 3 about here —
Figure 3 presents the corresponding results for East Germany. They suggest that
short-term training measures in East Germany generally do not have any positive
effects on the employment probability of their participants. Measured average treat-
ment effects are mostly small and statistically insignificant. The only exception are
men who receive treatment in months 7 to 12 (stratum 3) of their unemployment
spell. For these individuals, participating in short-term training increases their long-
term employment probability by about 5 percentage points. However, this effect is
only marginally statistically significant and does not seem to last in the long run.
— Figure 4 about here —
Results for the more substantive classroom further training measures (CFT) are
given in figures 4 and 5. The most conspicuous difference between these results and
those for short-term training programs is the long and pronounced lock-in effect.
During the first months of their participation in the program, participants have
an employment rate that is up to 25 percentage points lower than it would have
been if they had not taken part in the program. The lock-in period lasts up to 12
months for individuals who take up their treatment during the first 6 months of
their unemployment spell. Interestingly, lock-in effects are less deep and shorter for
individuals that have been unemployed for more than 6 months (stratum 3).
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There are several possible reasons for this finding. First, it might be that individu-
als with a longer elapsed unemployment duration are assigned to shorter measures
within the group of CFT programs. Second, it is possible that such individuals drop
out of the program more often or earlier. A third reason may be that a large number
of those just having become unemployed easily find new jobs if they do not take part
in a training program. If these individuals are assigned to CFT measures anyway,
they will be ‘locked-in’, while many of their counterparts in the control group have
already found employment. This would imply that some of the short-term unem-
ployed receive training even though they do not need it to overcome unemployment.
In addition, there may be a tendency towards finding less pronounced lock-in ef-
fects for the late program starts if many of the long-term unemployed in the control
group abandon their job search and move out of labor force. Hence, an additional
channel through which training programs work may consist in keeping the long-term
unemployed in the labor force.
— Figure 5 about here —
While there is little evidence for statistically significant employment effects for West
German men starting classroom further training in months 0 to 6 of their unemploy-
ment spell (strata 1 and 2) or West German women starting it in the first 3 months
of unemployment (stratum 1), treatment effects for longer-term unemployed men
(stratum 3) and medium to longer-term unemployed women (strata 2 and 3) are
large and statistically significant. After the initial lock-in phase, they amount to
some 8 percentage points for men and to some 10 percentage points for women.
The corresponding results for classroom further training measures in East Germany
are given in figure 5. As in West Germany, there are long and deep lock-in effects
of up to twenty five percentage points in the first 12 to 15 months after treatment
start. With the exception of men starting their program relatively early in their
unemployment spell (stratum 1), there is no evidence for positive treatment effects
after initial lock-in.
— Figure 6 about here —
In contrast to pure classroom further training, practical further training (PFT)
also includes practical elements such as internships or working in a practice firm.
Evaluation results for these measures are given in figure 6. The results for West
Germany shown in the first row of figure 6 suggest considerable positive employment
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effects of about 10 percentage points for women after a lock-in period of up to 8
months. There are no such effects for men. A reason for this finding could be that
particularly in practice-related jobs, men and women select themselves into different
occupations. If women more often participate in training for occupations in the
service sector, where employment chances are generally better than in manufacturing
or construction jobs, this will lead to more positive effects of practical training
measures for women.18
Similar as for other types of training, there are no employment effects for participants
in PFT in East Germany (second row of figure 6). The negative picture our results
draw for East Germany probably reflects the difficult labor market situation in
large parts of East Germany. In districts where open jobs are extremely rare in all
sectors, the potential employment effects of training programs may be very limited.
In addition to this, it is likely that the group of participants in East Germany differs
to some extent from that in West Germany. In regions with very high unemployment
rates, training programs may to a certain extent be used to reduce the frustration
of those who want to work, but have no employment prospects. In fact, differences
in selection into treatments may induce differences in treatment effects, if treatment
effects are heterogeneous.
— Figure 7 about here —
Finally, figure 7 shows estimated treatment effects for the very long retraining mea-
sures. Although the large majority of these programs do not last longer than two
years (see figure 16), no statistically positive employment effects can be observed up
to thirty months after program start. On the contrary, retraining measures cause a
grave lock-in effect of minus forty percentage points during most of the program’s
duration. Just in order to break even, employment gains after completion of the
program have to be very large and long-enduring given the large loss in employment
probability caused by the participation in the program (see discussion of cumulated
effects below).
6.2 Pairwise Evaluation of Training Programs
Given that in many cases, especially in West Germany, training programs may have
considerable employment effects when compared to attending no program, the ques-
18See Lechner et al. (2005b) or Fitzenberger and Völter (2007) who consider gender specific
target professions for public sector sponsored training in East Germany in the 1990s.
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tion arises which of the different training programs is the most effective for a given
subpopulation. The results presented in the previous section already suggest that
short-term training may have similar positive effects as classroom further training
or practical further training when each of the programs is compared to attending no
program. However, this does not necessarily mean that participants in short-term
training could not have improved their employment chances by attending classroom
or practical further training instead, or that participants in classroom or practical
further training would not have lost from taking part in short-term training instead.
This is the question we address next.
— Figures 8 and 9 about here —
Figures 8 and 9 show that participants in short-term training generally would not
have improved their employment chances by attending class room further training,
neither in East nor in West Germany.19 On the contrary, the much shorter and less
pronounced lock-in effect of short-term measures makes this form of training seem
more effective than the longer-term classroom training. This applies especially to
East German participants in the later strata who would have significantly lowered
their employment probability even in the long-run if they had attended classroom
further training instead of short-term training. Furthermore, figures 10 and 11 show
that participants in classroom further training would not have lost from attending
short-term training instead. This is remarkable since it means that these individuals
could have been assigned to the much less expensive short-term measures without
reducing their employment chances. Again, taking the shorter lock-in effect of short-
term measures at program start into account, short-term training would have even
been preferable for these individuals. Taken together, classroom further training is
on balance not more effective than short-term training.
— Figures 10 and 11 about here —
How does practical further training compare to short-term training? Figure 12 shows
that individuals who took part in short-term training would not have gained from
attending practical training instead. However, figure 13 indicates that practical
further training was significantly more effective for West Germans taking part in
this kind of training than short-term training would have been. This means that
19The evidence is not so clear for West German women who started the program after having
been unemployed for more than 4 months.
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it would not necessarily have been advisable for these individuals to substitute the
longer practical training courses by the shorter programs. It also means that, to a
certain extent, participants were well allocated to courses, as neither individuals in
short-term training nor individuals in practical further training would have gained
by reallocating them to the other program. As the last row of figure 12 shows, this
does not necessarily apply to East German participants in practical training whose
employment chances would not have been significantly reduced if they had been
reallocated to short-term training.
— Figures 12 and 13 about here —
How do the practical training courses compare to the more theoretical classroom
further training courses? Evidence on this comparison is given in figures 14 and
15. Figure 14 suggests that practical training was better for West German partic-
ipants of practical training than classroom training would have been. This holds
especially for female participants in West Germany whose employment probability
was significantly higher than it would have been in classroom training even long
after the programs ended. Note that in West Germany practical training programs
also exhibited significantly smaller lock-in effects which is not surprising given their
shorter length. The lower row of figure 15 shows that East German participants in
practical training would neither have gained nor would they have lost from taking
part in classroom further training instead.
— Figures 14 and 15 about here —
We omit comparisons with the long retraining programs as these comparisons are
entirely determined by the extensive lock-in effect of retraining (see figure 7). The
general conclusion is that shorter programs with positive employment effects out-
perform longer programs due to the difference in the length of the lock-in period.
6.3 Cumulated Effects
The higher effectiveness of shorter programs is confirmed in table 2 which shows gains
and losses in months employed for all pairwise comparisons cumulated over two years
after program start. For example, for West German men participating in short-term
training after having been unemployed for at least 7 months (stratum 3) the net gain
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of the program versus waiting is 0.903 employment months during the first 24 months
after the program start. The effects are even stronger for West German women who
gain on average 1.767 (stratum 2) and 2.122 (stratum 3) employment months. In
East Germany, only long-term unemployed men gain from taking part in short-
term training (plus 0.947 employment months, stratum 3). The results suggest that
short-term training is the only form of training that has positive and statistically
significant cumulated employment effects during the first two years, and this only
for the individuals who are not treated too early after entering unemployment.
— Table 2 about here —
Table 2 also nicely summarizes the comparative effectiveness of the different pro-
grams. Rows 2, 3, 16 and 17 show that short-term training was better in terms of
cumulated employment months for those participating in it than classroom further
training or practical further training would have been (STT vs. CFT). On the other
hand, rows 6 and 20 (CFT vs. STT) suggest that for participants in classroom fur-
ther training, short-term training would have been more effective. However, row 10
(PFT vs. STT) indicates that short-term training is not uniformly better than the
longer further training programs as West German participants in practical further
training would have lost if they had been assigned to short-term training measures
instead.20 On the one hand, the practical training programs stand out as quite ef-
fective, as e.g. participants of these courses fared significantly better than if they
had taken part in classroom further training courses (rows 11 and 25). On the other
hand, participants of classroom further training would not necessarily have gained
from switching to more practical courses (rows 7 and 21).
6.4 Effect Heterogeneity
The results presented so far reveal considerable heterogeneity in the effects of the
programs in different subpopulations. A consistent finding for West Germany seems
to be that programs are only effective for those individuals who start a program
after having been unemployed for some time. In East Germany this seems to be
reversed (see first two graphs in figure 5), suggesting that selection of subpopulations
into treatment may differ between East and West. Another finding is that training
effects are generally larger for women than for men (see e.g. figures 2 and 4).
20Of course, practical training courses are much more costly so that short-term training may
still have been the better alternative.
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Women also seem to benefit from practical training, while men do not (figure 6).
These results show that treatment effects averaged over too broad subpopulations
or heterogenous programs may hide statistically and economically significant effects
for particular subprograms or subpopulations.
In order to investigate effect heterogeneity also within the subgroups defined above,
we regressed cumulated individual treatment effects on a number of observed per-
sonal characteristics, see equation (4). Concretely, we considered individual treat-
ment effects (i.e. the difference between the actual and the nonparametrically pre-
dicted counterfactual outcome) cumulated over the period after lock-in (STT: after
month 8, PFT: after month 12, and CFT: after month 18) and divided by the num-
ber of months after lock-in. We are interested in how the treatment effects vary
with personal characteristics. We also account for the mismatch of the treated in-
dividual and the control group with respect to particular individual characteristics.
This allows us to compute ‘mismatch corrected’ treatment effects (by omitting the
mismatch when calculating average treatment effects based on the regression of in-
dividual treatment effects on personal characteristics). If our matching approach
works well, the mismatch-corrected average treatment effects have to coincide with
uncorrected average treatment effects.
The results are given in tables 8 to 10 in the appendix. Generally, we only report
specifications with significant covariates (we omit some covariates because of likely
multicollinearity problems). Therefore, a case with no coefficients reflects a situa-
tion where no significant covariates was be found. We find some evidence for effect
heterogeneity as in many cases older participants benefited less or not at all from
training programs. This holds specifically for East and West German participants
in short-term training (see table 8), West German women and East German men
and women participating in classroom further training (table 9) and West German
women participating in practical further training (table 10). In some cases, treat-
ment effects also vary with educational qualifications, especially in the case of West
German men taking part in short-term training (top panel of table 8) and West
German women taking part in classroom further training (middle panel of table 9).
In both cases low educational qualifications harm the effect of training on employ-
ment outcomes. We also note that in all cases, the mismatch-corrected estimates
of average treatment effects coincide with the uncorrected estimates which supports
the validity of our matching procedure.
We also investigated effect heterogeneity in pairwise program comparisons, but the
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results were less clear-cut.21 The general finding of both the comparisons of program
vs. non-participation and the cross-program comparisons seems to be that – in ad-
dition to the heterogeneity found between the subgroups defined by gender, region,
and unemployment duration – there is generally little heterogeneity along observed
characteristics. However, when there is such heterogeneity, it can be very strong.
This suggests that a better targeting of the programs could be achieved along these
lines.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzes and compares the employment effects of the four important
types of public sector sponsored training in Germany in the early 2000s. These
are short-term training (STT), classroom further training (CFT), practical further
training (PFT), and retraining (RT). In light of recent policy reforms fostering
shorter training programs, we are particularly interested in the question of how short-
term training programs compare in terms of effectiveness to traditional medium-
term further training schemes. Our econometric approach uses nonparametric kernel
matching methods in a dynamic, multiple treatment framework.
Our results suggest that the effectiveness of the different programs strongly depends
on the personal characteristics of the participants and the circumstances of program
participation. For West Germany, we find statistically significant positive employ-
ment effects for male and female participants in short-term training and classroom
further training who started their training not too early during their unemployment
spell. Moreover, West German women but not West German men benefited from
practical further training measures. A closer look reveals that, within the time
window permitted by our data set, employment effects of short-term training were
of a similar magnitude as those of traditional medium-term measures, but, due to
the shorter length, these positive effects materialized much earlier. According to
our results, West German men taking part in short-term training or medium-term
training may increase their medium-term employment rate by some 5 to 10 percent-
age points. The effect for women is even larger, leading to increases in employment
probabilities of 10 percentage points or more.
The surprising effectiveness of short-term training when compared to the different
forms of medium-term training is also confirmed in pairwise comparisons. According
21These results are available upon request.
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to our results, participants in short-term training would in general not have gained
if they had taken part in medium-term further training, and participants in the
latter programs would generally not have lost if they had been assigned to short-
term courses instead. In particular, this holds for the comparison of short-term
training and classroom further training. However, this is less clear in comparison
to practically oriented further training, where it appeared that participants of prac-
tical further training courses may have reduced their employment chances if they
had taken part in short-term training instead. As to the comparison of classroom
vs. practical further training, our results suggest that practical training may have
advantages over pure classroom training, a finding that is consistent with the in-
ternational evidence (see Martin and Grubb (2001) and OECD (2005)), but not
with evidence for Germany in the 1990’s (Lechner et al. (2005a), Fitzenberger et al.
(2006a), Fitzenberger and Völter (2007)).
We do not find any positive employment effects for the long retraining measures
during the time window permitted by our data. Even more than six months after
the completion of such a program, the employment rate of participants is below than
or equal to the employment rate of a comparable control group of non-participants.
Given the strong lock-in effect of these programs – during participation participants
have employment rates that may be 40 percentage points lower than those of non-
participants – it seems extremely unlikely that these measures justify their large
costs. Long-run evidence on retraining during the 1990’s in Lechner et al. (2005a,b),
Fitzenberger et al. (2006a), and Fitzenberger and Völter (2007) suggests that,
although there may be positive long-run effects, cumulated employment effects are
always lower than those of shorter programs.
The general ineffectiveness of long-term retraining and the only moderate effective-
ness of medium-term training when compared to short-term training suggests that
the policy shift that took place in 2002 and that massively substituted long-term
and medium-term training courses by inexpensive short-term courses was justified.
In fact, given our results, it may be well the case that further substitution of long-
and medium-term programs by short-term training may be warranted. Although we
lack detailed information on training costs, the results in table 2 combined with the
information on average costs in table 1 suggest that an average short-term train-
ing course costing only 627 Euros may lead to an employment gain of one month
within twenty four months after program start, while an average further training
or retraining course costing 6175 Euros leads to no gain or even a loss in months
employed within the first twenty four months after program start.
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While it is a common finding shared by studies such as Lechner et al. (2005a,b),
Fitzenberger et al. (2006a) and Hujer et al. (2004) that, especially if lock-in effects
are taken into account, shorter training programs may outperform longer ones,22 it
seems surprising that short-term programs lasting only two to twelve weeks may
have employment effects at all. Given that it is hard to believe that such short
programs lead to substantial increases in human capital, other aspects may be more
relevant. Looking at the particular contents of short-term training analyzed here,
it seems more plausible that these programs help to activate their participants who
may otherwise not look as intensively for new jobs as they do when they are assigned
short-term training programs that often comprise elements of profiling, job search
assistance, or monitoring. Our results are therefore in line with a number of recent
studies that focus on the positive effects of increased job search assistance and
activation, see e.g. Blundell et al. (2004), Weber and Hofer (2004), Fougère et al.
(2005), Hujer et al. (2005), Crépon et al. (2005), and Van den Berg and Van der
Klaauw (2006).
Furthermore, our results show that the effects of training programs may be very dif-
ferent across different subgroups. One result is that employment effects are usually
larger for individuals who start their program at a later point during their unem-
ployment spell. In fact, in many cases we do not find significant employment effects
for individuals who start their treatment very early in their unemployment spell.
It would be wrong to conclude from this that treatment is the more effective the
later it is provided to the participants as individuals who are long-term unemployed
may differ in observed and unobserved characteristics from those who are short-term
unemployed. However, the result is remarkable because it suggests that in cases of
long-term unemployment, training programs may help to restore the employment
chances of their participants. We also find that training effects may be heteroge-
nous with respect to gender, age, and qualification. In line with other results in the
literature (see Bergemann and van den Berg (2006) for an overview) we find that
employment effects of training are generally larger for women than for men. More-
over, it seems that older individuals benefit less from the training programs analyzed
here. In some cases, this also applies to individuals with low educational qualifi-
cations. Based on these results, it seems advisable that the targetting in program
assignment should be improved.
Finally, in contrast to the result of positive treatment effects in a number of cases
for West Germany, we find only little evidence for positive treatment effects in East
22However, note that neither of these studies consider the very short training programs analyzed
here.
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Germany. Apart from positive effects for East German men taking part in short-
and medium-term training after having been unemployed for more than six months,
and positive effects for men beginning classroom further training in the first three
months of their unemployment spell, we see little benefits from short-, medium-, or
long-term training in East Germany. In particular, we do not find any positive effects
for women. Our results for East Germany reflect the generally difficult labor market
situation in the East, especially for women. High unemployment rates seem to render
both short and medium-term training programs ineffective to a large extent, showing
that the effect of training may strongly depend on the specific circumstances of the
labor market under consideration. The ineffectiveness of training in East Germany
in the early 2000’s is in line with results by Lechner and Wunsch (2006), although
the latter paper takes a different methodological approach. However, the results are
in contrast to the somewhat more positive findings for the 1990’s (Lechner et al.
(2005b), Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007), Fitzenberger and Völter (2007)).
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Figures
Figure 1: Active Labor Market Policies in Germany
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Figure 2: Treatment Effect STT vs. Waiting, West Germany
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Figure 3: Treatment Effect STT vs. Waiting, East Germany
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Figure 4: Treatment Effect CFT vs. Waiting, West Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Stratum 1 denotes entry into program during months 0
to 3 of unemployment, stratum 2 during months 4 to 6, and stratum 3 during months 7 to 12.
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Figure 5: Treatment Effect CFT vs. Waiting, East Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Stratum 1 denotes entry into program during months 0
to 3 of unemployment, stratum 2 during months 4 to 6, and stratum 3 during months 7 to 12.
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Figure 6: Treatment Effect PFT vs. Waiting, West and East Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Entry into program during months 0 to 12 of
unemployment spell.
43
Figure 7: Treatment Effect RT vs. Waiting, West and East Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Entry into program during months 0 to 12 of
unemployment spell. East Germany: pooled sample containing male and female participants.
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Figure 8: Treatment Effect STT vs. CFT, West Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Stratum 1 denotes entry into program during months 0
to 3 of unemployment, stratum 2 during months 4 to 6, and stratum 3 during months 7 to 12.
45
Figure 9: Treatment Effect STT vs. CFT, East Germany
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
−6 0 6 12 18 24 30
Month
STT vs CFT, East=1, Female=0, Stratum 1
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
−6 0 6 12 18 24 30
Month
STT vs CFT, East=1, Female=1, Stratum 1
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
−6 0 6 12 18 24 30
Month
STT vs CFT, East=1, Female=0, Stratum 2
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
−6 0 6 12 18 24 30
Month
STT vs CFT, East=1, Female=1, Stratum 2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
−6 0 6 12 18 24 30
Month
STT vs CFT, East=1, Female=0, Stratum 3
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
−6 0 6 12 18 24 30
Month
STT vs CFT, East=1, Female=1, Stratum 3
Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Stratum 1 denotes entry into program during months 0
to 3 of unemployment, stratum 2 during months 4 to 6, and stratum 3 during months 7 to 12.
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Figure 10: Treatment Effect CFT vs. STT, West Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Stratum 1 denotes entry into program during months 0
to 3 of unemployment, stratum 2 during months 4 to 6, and stratum 3 during months 7 to 12.
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Figure 11: Treatment Effect CFT vs. STT, East Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Stratum 1 denotes entry into program during months 0
to 3 of unemployment, stratum 2 during months 4 to 6, and stratum 3 during months 7 to 12.
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Figure 12: Treatment Effect STT vs. PFT, West and East Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Entry into program during months 0 to 12 of
unemployment spell.
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Figure 13: Treatment Effect PFT vs. STT, West and East Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Entry into program during months 0 to 12 of
unemployment spell.
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Figure 14: Treatment Effect PFT vs. CFT, West and East Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Entry into program during months 0 to 12 of
unemployment spell.
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Figure 15: Treatment Effect CFT vs. PFT, West and East Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-
treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa. Entry into program during months 0 to 12 of
unemployment spell.
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Tables
Table 1: Average Expenditures per Participant in Short-term, Further and Retrain-
ing in Germany from 2000-2003
2000 2001 2002 2003
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Short-term
training
580 1,2 570 1,1 658 0,9 538 1
Further/retrain-
ing
1627 8,2 1668 9,3 1686 9,1 1555 10,5
– subsistence al-
lowance
1152 1178 1188 1156
– training costs 640 664 681 631
Note: Columns labeled with a (1) contain the average monthly expenditures (in Euro) per partic-
ipant, columns labeled with a (2) display the average duration of the program in months. Source:
Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Daten zu den Eingliederungsbilanzen 2001,2002a-2004a.
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Table 2: Cumulated Treatment Effects after 24 Months
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Appendix
Table 3: Entries into Active Labor Market Programs in Germany from 2000 - 2004
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Qualification schemes 1,153,720 1,069,409 1,457,047 1,502,166 1,548,439
– further/retraining 551,534 449,622 456,301 254,718 185,041
– short-term training 476,672 565,132 877,038 1,064,293 1,188,369
Employment subsidies 458,557 464,904 538,312 807,682 950,109
Placement and advisory ser-
vices
601,281 742,065 947,098 1,460,170 2,566,780
Specific measures for young
adults
445,823 457,724 447,265 388,810 408,168
Public Job Creation 314,291 246,084 219,626 193,999 170,107
Other 391,122 515,670 453,224 212,183 309,446
Total 3,364,794 3,495,856 4,062,572 4,565,010 5,953,049
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Arbeitsmarkt 2002b-2005b, own calculations.
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Table 4: Sample Sizes
East=0, Fem.=0 East=0, Fem.=1 East=1, Fem.=0 East=1, Fem.=1
Stratum 1 (0-3 Months)
Waiting 29351 18409 15505 8538
STT 912 693 621 368
CFT 389 344 265 136
RT 263 262 86
Stratum 2 (4-6 Months)
Waiting 18529 12572 10270 6450
STT 547 409 339 286
CFT 251 194 218 143
Stratum 3 (7-12 Months)
Waiting 10996 8421 5810 4277
STT 662 497 471 353
CFT 270 201 264 218
Aggregated Stratum 1 for PFT (0-12 Months)
Waiting 25854 16060 12636 6614
STT 2120 1593 1432 1013
CFT 915 741 742 495
PFT 263 234 145 98
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Table 5: Variable Definitions
Name Definition
east 1 if place of residence is in East Germany (Berlin in-
cluded), 0 otherwise
female 1 if female, 0 otherwise
agegroup age in 6 groups
foreigner 1 if citizenship is not German, 0 otherwise
ethnicgerman 1 if ethnic German, i.e. returned settler from former
German settlements, 0 otherwise
qualification 1 no degree, 2 vocational training degree, 3 university
or technical college degree
schooling 1 no schooling degree, 2 Hauptschulabschluss or Mit-
tlere Reife /Fachoberschule (degrees reached after com-
pletion of the 9th or 10th grade), 3 Fachhochschulreife
or Abitur/Hochschulreife (degrees reached after comple-
tion of the 12th or 13th grade)
health 1 no health problems mentioned, 2 health problems, but
considered without impact on placement, 3 health prob-
lems considered to have an impact on placement
pasthealth same categories as health, but referring to the past two
years before the beginning of the unemployment spell
disabled 1 if disabled, 0 otherwise
land 16 categories for the German Bundesländer
area German Bundesländer aggregated into 6 categories. 1
SH, NI, HB, HH; 2 NW, 3 HE, RP, SL; 4 BY, BW; 5
MV, BB, BE; 6 SN, ST, TH
region classification of the districts of residence according to
local labor market conditions in 5 groups
family 1 missing, 2 living alone, 3 not married, but living to-
gether with at least one person, 4 single parent, 5 mar-
ried
married 1 missing, 2 married, 3 not married
child 1 if at least one child, 0 otherwise
youngchild 1 if at least one child younger than 10 years, 0 otherwise
<continued on next page>
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Table 5: Variable Definitions <continued>
Name Definition
occupation occupation of last employment in 7 categories
industry industry of last employment in 6 categories
occhange 1 missing, 2 if the person wishes to work in the same
occupation as in the last employment, 3 otherwise
parttime 1 if the person worked less than full-time in the last
employment, 0 otherwise
whitecollar 2 if the previous employment was a white-collar job, 3
if it was a blue-collar job, 1 missing
problemgroup 1 if participation in a program with a social work com-
ponent within the last three years, 0 otherwise
onlyparttime 1 if information available that only part-time job is de-
sired, 0 otherwise
endlastjob 2 termination of last occupation by employer, 3 by em-
ployee, 4 limited in time, 5 other and missing
quarter quarter of the end of the last employment (from 1 to 9)
penalty 1 if the unemployed had a period of disqualification from
benefits within the last three years, 0 otherwise
motivationlack 1 if within the last three years there is information, that
the person did not appear regularly at the labor office,
on lack of cooperation, availability or similar
pasttreatcancel 1 if abandonment of a program in the past according to
the benefit data, 0 otherwise
pastincapacity 1 if incapapacity of work due to illness, parental leave,
cure or therapy within the last three years
proposals number of placement proposals divided by the days since
the beginning of the unemployment spell and the start
date of the spell from which the information is taken
dapp 1 if employed as apprentice within the last three years
before the beginning of the unemployment spell, 0 oth-
erwise
<continued on next page>
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Table 5: Variable Definitions <continued>
Name Definition
countemp, countub, coun-
tua, countsp, countoos,
countcontact
number of days within the last three years before the be-
ginning of unemployment spent in regular employment,
receiving unemployment benefits, unemployment assis-
tance, subsistance payment, out of sample, in contact
with the labor office, respectively
demp6, demp12, demp24,
demp6_12, demp12_24
1 if in regular employment 6, 12, 24, 6 and 12 and 12
and 24 months, respectively, before the beginning of the
unemployment spell
waged daily wage in the last job(s) before the beginning of the
unemployment spell
ddssec, ddcens, ddmarg dummies if waged is censored: ddsec is 1 if earnings
are within the social security thresholds, ddcens is 1 if
earnings are above the social security threshold, ddmarg
is 1 if earnings are below the social security threshold
lnwage, lnwagedsq log(waged) and log(waged) squared interacted with
ddssec
wage total wage in the last year before the beginning of the
unemployment spell
dssec, dcens, dmarg censoring dummies referring to wage (see above)
lnwage, lnwagesq log(wage) and log(wage) squared interacted with dssec
ur_yb, ur_qb, ur_qb3,
ur_qb6, ur_qb12, ur_qb24
unemployment rate in the individual’s home district in
the calendar year before the beginning of unemploy-
ment, in the last month of the quarter before the be-
ginning of unemployment, and in the last month of the
quarter before the beginning of the stratum, respectively
Note: If not mentioned otherwise, variables are defined relative to the beginning of the time window
of elapsed unemployment duration.
59
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max
East=0, Female=0
age 36.90053 7.718731 25 36 53
foreigner .1736603 .378823 0 0 1
schooling1 .1237411 .3292911 0 0 1
schooling2 .7414522 .4378433 0 1 1
schooling3 .1348067 .3415223 0 0 1
qualification1 .3572672 .4792019 0 0 1
qualification2 .5908243 .4916894 0 1 1
qualification3 .0519085 .2218457 0 0 1
countemp 801.0523 287.0826 86 873 1096
East=0, Female=1
age 37.94112 7.889209 25 37 53
foreigner .1079787 .3103611 0 0 1
schooling1 .0723604 .25909 0 0 1
schooling2 .7323496 .4427451 0 1 1
schooling3 .19529 .3964335 0 0 1
qualification1 .3214931 .467061 0 0 1
qualification2 .6059022 .488668 0 1 1
qualification3 .0726047 .2594928 0 0 1
countemp 776.9238 312.8626 86 845 1096
East=1, Female=0
age 38.3997 7.844472 25 38 53
foreigner .0340613 .1813919 0 0 1
schooling1 .0546255 .2272544 0 0 1
schooling2 .8529804 .3541357 0 1 1
schooling3 .0923941 .2895899 0 0 1
qualification1 .1134218 .3171169 0 0 1
qualification2 .8383827 .3681101 0 1 1
qualification3 .0481956 .2141855 0 0 1
countemp 829.9092 272.4151 86 914 1096
East=1, Female=1
age 39.21149 7.836369 25 39 53
foreigner .0256919 .1582228 0 0 1
schooling1 .038329 .1919993 0 0 1
schooling2 .8185901 .3853776 0 1 1
schooling3 .1430809 .3501737 0 0 1
qualification1 .1095561 .312352 0 0 1
qualification2 .8129504 .3899717 0 1 1
qualification3 .0774935 .2673868 0 0 1
countemp 748.3454 309.1351 86 762 1096
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Table 7: Program Duration of Analyzed Participations
N Min Mean Median 75th Perc. 95th Perc. Max
STT 6158 1 1.6 1 2 3 24
CFT 2893 1 8.2 8 12 14 37
PFT 740 1 6.5 7 8 12 26
RT 1066 1 23.5 24 26 37 53
Total 10857 1 5.8 2 8 24 53
Figure 16: Densities of Program Duration
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Table 8: Effect Heterogeneity, STT vs. Waiting
East=0, Sex=0
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup6 -0.107 (0.051)∗∗
qualification1 -0.083 (0.031)∗∗∗
_cons 0.015 (0.016) 0.082 (0.022)∗∗∗
N 908 547 662
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.008 0.033 0.047
East=0, Sex=1
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup5 -0.139 (0.058)∗∗
agegroup6 -0.124 (0.063)∗
qualification1 -0.059 (0.159)
mismqualification1 -0.079 (0.152)
_cons 0.045 (0.053) 0.151 (0.026)∗∗∗
N 693 409 492
corrected ATT with CI 0.026 [-0.006, 0.059]
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.028 0.090 0.113
East=1, Sex=0
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup6 -0.208 (0.057)∗∗∗ -0.282 (0.140)∗∗ -0.133 (0.132)
family5 0.127 (0.075)∗ 0.160 (0.053)∗∗∗
mismagegroup6 0.077 (0.124) -0.041 (0.113)
mismfamily5 -0.014 (0.061) -0.055 (0.038)
mismqualification3 0.117 (0.068)∗
_cons 0.045 (0.017)∗∗∗ -0.001 (0.048) -0.005 (0.035)
N 619 332 470
corrected ATT with CI 0.026 [-0.024, 0.075] 0.055 [0.013, 0.097]
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.027 0.027 0.053
East=1, Sex=1
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup6 -0.200 (0.105)∗
mismagegroup1 -0.091 (0.043)∗∗
mismagegroup6 0.020 (0.087)
_cons 0.045 (0.030)
N 368 286 350
corrected ATT with CI 0.018 [-0.031, 0.067]
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.011 0.038 0.014
Empty entries indicate that the regressor is not included in the final specification due to lack of
significance or due to a multicollinearity problem. Specifications without significant covariates are
not reported (columns in which no coefficients are reported).
∗∗∗ = statistically significant at 1 %, ∗∗ = at 5 %, ∗ = at 10 %, bootstrapped standard errors
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Table 9: Effect Heterogeneity, CFT vs. Waiting
East=0, Sex=0
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
occupation1 0.178 (0.094)∗
_cons -0.003 (0.033)
N 385 249 265
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.023 0.021 0.095
East=0, Sex=1
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup4 -0.209 (0.110)∗
agegroup5 -0.166 (0.245)
agegroup6 -0.210 (0.243)
qualification1 -0.168 (0.095)∗
mismagegroup5 0.025 (0.201)
mismagegroup6 0.025 (0.216)
_cons 0.154 (0.044)∗∗ 0.187 (0.073)∗∗
N 344 192 199
corrected ATT with CI 0.099 [0.016, 0.181]
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.045 0.121 0.098
East=1, Sex=0
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup6 -0.300 (0.093)∗∗∗ -0.219 (0.121)∗
mismagegroup6 -0.008 (0.069)
_cons 0.085 (0.033)∗∗ 0.078 (0.045)∗
N 265 218 252
corrected ATT with CI 0.052 [-0.028, 0.131]
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.096 0.060 0.046
East=1, Sex=1
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup6 -0.187 (0.101)∗
_cons 0.035 (0.032)
N 136 143 217
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.014 0.045 0.020
Empty entries indicate that the regressor is not included in the final specification due to lack of
significance or due to a multicollinearity problem. Specifications without significant covariates are
not reported (columns in which no coefficients are reported).
∗∗∗ = statistically significant at 1 %, ∗∗ = at 5 %, ∗ = at 10 %, bootstrapped standard errors
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Table 10: Effect Heterogeneity, PFT vs. Waiting
East=0, Sex=0
N 258
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.023
East=0, Sex=1
agegroup6 -0.279 (0.111)∗∗
_cons 0.121 (0.031)∗∗∗
N 233
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.094
East=1, Sex=0
agegroup6 -0.196 (0.244)
mismagegroup6 -0.009 (0.237)
_cons 0.072 (0.057)
N 145
corrected ATT with CI 0.045 [-0.030, 0.119]
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.045
East=1, Sex=1
N 97
comparable uncorr. ATT 0.068
Empty entries indicate that the regressor is not included in the final specification due to lack of
significance or due to a multicollinearity problem. Specifications without significant covariates are
not reported (columns in which no coefficients are reported).
∗∗∗ = statistically significant at 1 %, ∗∗ = at 5 %, ∗ = at 10 %, bootstrapped standard errors
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